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FDIC  POLICY  TOWARD  B  K  FAILURES 
The  marked  increase  in  the  number  and  size  of 
banks  that  have  failed  in  recent  years  has  focused 
attention  on  the  problems  connected  with  bank 
failures  and  the  appropriate  aid  bank  regulatory 
agencies  should  provide  to  banks  in  distress. 
Since  this  aid  is  designed  to  maintain  public  con- 
fidence  in  the  banking  system,  there  is  a  need  for 
greater  public  understanding  of  policies  toward 
banks  with  serious  problems.  Special  attention 
is  given  in  this  article  to  the  activities  of  the 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  in  pro- 
viding  assistance  to  insolvent  banks.  The  differ- 
ent  forms  this  assistance  has  taken  over  the  years, 
as  well  as  current  FDIC  policy  as  revealed  in 
two  recent  large  bank  failures,  are  examined. 
Special  problems  relating  to  large  bank  failures 
raise  questions  concerning  the  adequacy  of  the 
size  of  the  deposit  insurance  fund,  the  constraint 
this  fund  places  on  FDJC  decisions,  and  the 
coordination  and  cooperation  among  bank  regu- 
latory  agencies  necessary  to  minimize  the  impact 
of  bank  failures.  These  issues  will  also  be  dis- 
cussed. 
The  prevention  of  wholesale  bank  failures  has 
been  the  expressed  intent  of  Congress  since  the 
establishment  of  the  Reconstruction  Finance  Cor- 
poration  and  the  enactment  of  the  Glass-SteagaIl 
bill  in  1932.  These  emergency  measures  were 
followed  by  the  passage  of  the  Banking  Act  oi 
1933,  which  was  intended  to  be  a  permanent 
answer  to  the  problem  of  widespread  bank  fail- 
*  ures  (over  11,000  banks  failed  between  1921  and 
1933,  nearly  half  of  these  after  1930).  The  Act 
established  a  national  deposit  insurance  system 
under  the  FDIC.  This  was  an  important  element 
in  the  fight  to  restore  confidence  in  the  commer- 
cial  banking  system  and  resulted  in  a  precipitous 
decline  in  the  number  of  failures  after  1933,  as 
shown  in  Chart  1.  Over  the  years  deposit  insur- 
ance  has  helped  to  strengthen  the  banking  system 
and  has  served  as  a  stabilizing  influence  on  the 
economy. 
The  mandate  given  the  FDIC  by  Congress  in 
1933  was  quite  cIear.  Its  purpose  was  to  ‘lpur- 
chase,  hold,  and  liquidate  .  . . the  assets  of  banks 
which  have  been  closed;  and  to  insure  the  de- 
posits  of  all  banks.”  This  prescribed  order  of 
duties  supports  the  proposition  that  “the  primary 
function  of  deposit  insurance  is,  and  always  has 
been,  protection  of  the  circulating  medium  from 
the  consequences  of  bank  iailures.  That  insur- 
ance  also  serves  the  purpose  of  guarding  the 
small  depositor  against  loss  from  bank  failures 
cannot  be  denied,  but  this  function  is  of  second- 
ary  importance”  [3,  p.  1911.  Deposit  insurance 
provides  a  safety  mechanism  against  a  sudden 
decline  in  the  money  supply  through  bank  fail- 
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3 ures  (see  box  insert).  Rather  than  simply  re- 
placing  deposits  of  failed  banks,  deposit  insurance 
reduces  the  incidence  of  failure  by  assuring  the 
public  that  bank  deposits  are  safe-thereby  pre- 
venting  runs  that  can  topple  even  sound  banks. 
The  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
was  established  to  assist  in  the  protection  of  the 
nation’s  money  supply.  Though  the  Corporation’s 
raison  d’etre  is widely  accepted,  its  operating  methods 
have  been  a  controversial  issue.  The  regulatory 
agencies  in  general  and  the  FDIC  in  particular, 
charged  with  carrying  out  Congressional  statutes, 
must  decide  which  of  their  powers  gives  the 
greatest  support  to  the  banking  system.  The 
choice  of  methods  employed  by  the  FDIC  has 
resulted  from  consideration  of  the  financial  status 
of  the  banks  in  question,  different  interpretations 
of  Congressional  intent,  and  Congressional  in- 
quiry  itself.  This  choice  has  been  a  difficult  one 
-one  that  has  caused  debate  in  the  past  and  will 
undoubtedly  continue  to  do  so  in  the  future. 
The  FDIC  has  four  alternative  procedures  that 
may  be  followed  in  assisting  a  failed  or  failing 
bank.  These  alternatives  are  : 
1.  DIRECT  PAYMENT  OF  INSURED  DE- 
POSITS:  Acting  as  receiver  of  the  bank’s  assets 
and  making  direct  payments  to  insured  depositors; 
2.  DEPOSIT  ASSUMPTION:  Facilitating  a 
merger  with  a  healthy  institution  or  replacement. 
by  a  new  organization  with  new  ownership  and 
management,  through  loans  and/or  purchase  of 
assets,  thereby  protecting  all  deposits; 
3.  DIRECT  LOANS:  Supplying  direct  financial 
aid  in  an  effort  to  correct.  deficiencies  to  allow  the 
bank  to  continue  in  operation  ; 
4.  DEPOSIT  INSURANCE  NATIONAL 
BANK:  Operating  a  Deposit  Insurance  National 
Bank  for  a  maximum  of  two  years  prior  to  a 
deposit  payoff  or  deposit  assumption. 
The  first  two  methods  of  operation  have  been 
authorized  since  the  establishment  of  the  Cor- 
poration  and  have  been,  by  far,  the  most  com- 
monly  used.  While  the  maximum  deposit  insur- 
ance  protection  has  been  increased  from  time  to 
time  (from  $2,500  in  1933  to  the  present  $40,000), 
legislators  have  taken  the  position  that  “it  should 
never  be  the  policy  of  Congress  to  guarantee  the 
safety  of  all  deposits  in  all  banks”  [9,  p.  21. 
Under  the  direct  payment  to  depositors  method 
this  mandate  is  maintained.  If  a  bank  is  closed 
by  the  appropriate  state  or  Federal  authority  and 
placed  into  receivership  for  liquidation  of  assets, 
the  insured  deposits  are  paid  up  to  the  maximum 
allowed  by  law.  On  the  other  hand,  extension  of 
advances  to  other  banks  to  assume  the  deposit 
liabilities  of  a  failing  bank  protects  depositors  in 
full.  It  has  been  recognized,  however,  that  the 
deposit  assumption  method  has  additional  bene- 
fits  not  available  through  deposit  payoffs.  In 
some  cases,  the  continuation  of  banking  services 
to  the  community  and  minimizing  the  impact  of 
the  failure  may  be  vital  considerations. 
FDIC  Activity  and  Congressional  Supervision 
When  distress  situations  occur,  the  FDIC  has 
attempted  to  safeguard  the  public’s  trust  in  bank- 
ing  largely  through  a  varying  policy  of  direct 
deposit  payoffs  and  deposit  assumptions  via  mer- 
gers.  Table  I  outlines  FDIC  assistance  to  failed 
banks  since  1946.  It  shows  that  FDIC  officials 
avoided  the  direct  payment  of  insured  deposits 
between  1946  and  1954.  Corporation  officials 
felt  that  such  procedures,  with  the  loss  of  some 
depositors’  funds  and  an  interruption  of  banking 
services,  did  not  provide  the  support  needed  to 
maintain  confidence  in  the  banking  system.  In- 
stead,  mergers  (usually  consummated  with  finan- 
cial  aid  from  the  Corporation)  were  the  exclusive 
method  used  over  this  period. 
Congress  challenged  the  Corporation’s  avoid- 
ance  of  the  direct  payment  method  through  re- 
ceivership  in  1951  [lo].  The  contention  was  that 
the  FDIC  had  insufficient  evidence  in  some  cases 
to  base  a  decision  on  whether  or  not  the  assump- 
tion  of  assets  by  a  healthy  bank  would  reduce  the 
risk  or  avert  a  loss  to  the  Corporation’s  insuranc:e 
fund  as  required  by  law.  Some  legislators  argued 
that  the  FDIC  did  not  know  the  full  extent  of  its 
liability  in  all  such  cases,  and  therefore  it  may  ble 
preferable  for  banks  to  be  placed  into  receiver- 
ship  and  direct  payments  on  all  insured  deposits 
be  made.  The  Corporation,  nevertheless,  con- 
tinued  its  established  policies  until  1955,  when 
four  deposit  payoffs  were  experienced. 
The  methods  used  to  assist  distressed  banks 
have  undergone  Congressional  scrutiny  periodi- 
cally  since  1956,  reaching  full  force  in  1965.  Seve:n 
banks  failed  in  1964-all  being  placed  into  ret- 
ceivership  and  only  the  insured  deposits  paid. 
The  direct  concern  of  legislators  this  time,  how- 
ever,  was  not  100  percent  insurance  protection 
versus  limited  protection.  Instead,  the  adequacy 
and  quality  of  Federal  banking  supervision,  ex- 
amination,  and  interagency  cooperation  became 
the  main  subjects  of  Congressional  inquiry. 
Of  immediate  concern  to  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Government  Operations  [ 1 l]  was  the  growing 
number  of  abuses  by  bank  management  that  had 
been  prime  factors  in  the  increasing  incidence  of 
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To  understand  how  bank  failures  can  result  in  a  sudden  decline  in  the  money  supply,  it 
is  first  necessary  to  recognize  three  factors  accounting  for  changes  in  the  stock  of  money?  (1) 
“high-powered  money”  (H),  (2)  the  ratio  of  commercial  bank  deposits  to  bank  reserves  (D/R), 
and  (3)  the  ratio  of  deposits  to  currency  held  by  the  public  (D,‘C).  High-powered  money  is 
defined  as  the  amount  of  currency  held  by  the  public  plus  bank  vault  cash  plus  reserves  held 
as  deposits  with  the  Federal  Reserve-the  latter  two  components  making  up  member  bank  re- 
serves.  One  dollar  of  high-powered  money  held  as  bank  reserves  can  support  several  dollars 
of  deposits  under  a  fractional  reserve  banking  system.  A  change  in  the  total  of  high-powered 
money  will  result  in  an  equal  percentage  change  in  the  stock  of  money,  other  things  equal 
(namely  D/R  and  D/C). 
The  effects  on  the  money  stock  of  changes  in  the  deposit/currency  and  deposit/reserve 
ratios  are  interdependent.  The  magnitudes  of  these  ratios  are  determined  by  decisions  of  the 
public  concerning  the  composition  of  their  cash  balances  and  bank  liquidity  decisions,  respec- 
tively.  Requirements  imposed  by  law  affect  reserves  held  by  banks  and  the  relative  desira- 
bility  of  currency  and  deposits-thereby  influencing  these  decisions.  in  addition,  the  payment 
of  interest  and  services  offered  by  banks  affect  the  D/C  ratic,?  while  the  public’s  desire  to 
change  the  composition  of  cash  balances  held  may  have  an  impact  on  the  D/R  ratio.  A  deci- 
sion  to  hold  a  larger  proportion  of  cash  balances  in  currency  and  less  in  deposits  alters  the 
aggregate  amount  of  the  money  supply  as  well  as  its  composition.  Under  fractional  reserve 
banking,  a  withdrawal  of  deposits  from  the  system  reduces  total  bank  reserves,  which,  unless 
otherwise  replaced,  forces  a  multiple  contraction  of  earning  assets  and  deposits.  The  lower  the 
deposit/currency  ratio,  the  smaller  the  fraction  of  high-powered  money  in  the  form  of  bank 
reserves  and,  therefore,  the  smaller  the  money  stock.  The  formula  connecting  these  factors  with 
the  mdney  stock  is  useful  in  viewing  the  consequent  impact  of  a  downward  shift  in  the  public’s 
desired  deposit/currency  ratio:  M  =  H [ D/R(l  -j-  D/C)]/[D/R  +-  D/C].  Since  D/R  is  significantly 
greater  than  unity,  a  reduction  in  D/C  will  result  in  a  decline  in  hri  (assuming  H  constant). 
The  public  cannot  determine  the  aggregate  level  of  either  deposits  or  currency.  it  can, 
however,  determine  the  ratio  of  deposits  to  currency  as  long  as  convertibility  between  the  two 
is  maintained.  Since  a  shift  in  this  ratio  can  have  a  multiplicative  impact  on  the  total  money 
supply,  an  examination  of  the  variables  determining  its  magnitude  is  essential.  In  a  study 
of  the  demand  for  currency  in  the  United  States  [l],  Phillip  Cagan  found  that  the  expected  net 
rate  of  interest  paid  on  deposits  and  expected  real  income  per  capita  have  been  major  deter- 
minants  of  the  demand  for  currency  relative  to  deposits. 
While  Cagan’s  results  show  that  the  deposit/currency  ratio  increases  proportionally  with 
expected  real  income,  of  greatest  interest  at  present  is  the  relation  between  this  ratio  and  the 
net  rate  of  interest  paid  on  deposits  (interest  paid  explicitly  or  implicitly  through  free  services 
minus  service  charges  and  expected  losses).  The  D/C  ratio  varies  positively  with  changes  in  the 
net  rate  of  interest  on  deposits-i.e.,  as  the  net  expected  rate  paid  on  deposits  declines,  so 
does  the  deposit/currency  ratio.  During  periods  when  expected  losses  on  deposits  from  bank 
suspensions  are  high,  the  net  rate  of  interest  paid  on  deposits  may  become  negative  (the  de- 
positor  may  even  lose  all  of  his  funds).  Under  such  conditions,  it  is  only  normal  for  the  public 
to  wish  to  hold  the  more  desirable  (less  expensive)  form  of  money-currency.  If  the  withdrawal 
of  deposits  occurs  on  a  large  scale,  the  bank  may  be  forced  to  dump  many  of  its  assets  on  the 
market  to  meet  its  liquidity  needs  unless  additional  high-powered  money  is  acquired  to  meet 
the  currency  demands,of  the  public. 
Some  bank  failures,  unless  neutralized,  can  lead  to  massive  withdrawals  of  deposits  and 
the  creation  of  liquidity  problems  for  other  banks-regardless  of  their  financial  position.  It  is 
the  responsibility  of  Federal  banking  agencies  to  neutralize  bank  failures  and  maintain  public 
confidence  in  banking  to  prevent  indiscriminant  runs  on  banks  that  may  have  serious  conse- 
quences  for  the  nation’s  money  supply. 
‘Much  of  this  discussion  is  from  [2]. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND bank  failures.  Investigation  of  several  banks  actions  by  bank  management.  The  FDIC, 
involving  dishonesty  on  the  part  of  bank  officials  charged  with  supervising  the  bank  in  receiver- 
revealed  a  lack  of  interagency  cooperation.  The  ship  and  making  payments  to  depositors,  and  the 
cause  of  the  failure  of  the  San  Francisco  National  Federal  Reserve,  responsible  for  making  funds 
Bank  in  January  1965,  for  example,  was  not  re-  available  to  member  banks  in  times  of  financial 
vealed  to  the  FDIC  or  the  Federal  Reserve  Sys-  stress  (over  $9  million  to  San  Francisco  Nation- 
tem  until  the  bank  was  placed  in  receivership-  al),  were  precluded  from  entering  a  joint  effort 
































Table  I 
INSURED  BANK  FAILURES,  DEPOSIT  PROTECTION,  AND  FDIC  DISBURSEMENTS 
Banks  Placed  Banks’  Banks  Receiving  FDIC  Disbursements  FDIC  Disbursements 
in  Receivership  Deposits  Direct  Loans  From  in  Deposit  Payoffs  in  Deposit  Assumptions 





































































































































*  One  bank  placed  into  receivership  of  state  bank  authorities  in  1957;  two  each  in  1958,  1959,  1964,  and  1971. 
**  Deposit  insurance  national  banks  were  formed  by  the  receiver  of  two  closed  banks. 
***  FDIC  disbursements  in  1975  in  connection  with  its  insurance  responsibilities  totalled  $305.6  million. 
Note:  Deposit  poyoff  figures  are  for  Dec.  31  of  respective  year  plus  estimated  additional  disbursements  for  the  respective  banks. 
Source:  Annual  Report  of  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  annually. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1976 members  of  the  Senate  committee  concluded  that 
cooperation  and  liaison  among  the  Federal  bank- 
ing  agencies  were  absolutely  vital  to  the  public 
interest. 
Legislation  designed  to  aid  the  regulatory 
agencies  in  protecting  banks  from  criminal  acts 
and  gross  mismanagement  followed  with  the  pas- 
sage  in  1966  of  the  Financial  Institutions  Super- 
visory  and  Insurance  Act,  which  provided  cease 
and  desist  powers  and  provisions  for  removal  of 
officers  and  directors.  An  increase  in  the  number 
of  problem  banks,  plus  the  limited  use  of  the 
newly  provided  supervisory  powers  spurred  an- 
other  Banking  and  Currency  Committee  investi- 
gation  in  1971. 
In  his  statement  before  the  Committee  [S,  pp. 
10-111,  Frank  Wille,  Chairman  of  the  FDIC, 
outlined  the  Corporation’s  procedures  and  prior- 
ities  concerning  failing  banks.  Mr.  Wille  empha- 
sized  that  the  Corporation  had  no  say  in  the 
closing  of  insured  banks-this  was  the  responsi- 
bility  of  its  chartering  authority:  the  Comptroller 
of  the  Currency  in  the  case  of  national  banks  or 
the  appropriate  state  authority  in  the  case  of  state 
banks.  It  is  mandatory,  however,  that  the  Cor- 
poration  serve  as  the  receiver  of  all  national  banks 
and  serve  as  receiver  of  state  banks  when  ap- 
pointed.  When  this  happens,  the  FDIC  Board  of 
Directors  generally  determines  whether  the  de- 
posit  payoff  or  deposit  assumption  procedure 
should  be  foIlowed.  The  second  method  is  uti- 
lized,  however,  only  when  the  prospective  cost  to 
the  Corporation  is  less  than  the  cost  through  the 
deposit  payoff  alternative.  A  prerequisite  to  a 
deposit  assumption,  of  course,  would  be  an  exist- 
ing  or  newly  organized  bank  that  is  willing  to 
enter  into  such  a  transaction  and  that  is  accept- 
able  to  the  appropriate  chartering  authority  as 
well  as  to  the  FDIC. 
The  Corporation  added  new  scope  to  its  oper- 
ations  in  1971  when  it  used,  for  the  first  time,  the 
direct  loan  authority  granted  in  1950.  At  that 
time,  the  Corporation  was  authorized  to  provide 
direct  financial  assistance  to  an  insured  operating 
bank  in  danger  of  closing  whenever,  in  the  opin- 
ion  of  the  FDIC  Board  of  Directors,  the  con- 
tinued  operation  of  such  a  bank  was  essential  in 
providing  adequate  banking  service  in  the  com- 
munity.  Even  in  this  case,  assistance  is  withheld 
if  individuals  responsible  for  the  bank’s  poor  con- 
dition  will  benefit  financially  or  if  it  appears  that 
assistance  may  be  required  over  a  prolonged 
period. 
This  authority  has  been  used  only  three  times 
-July  1971,  January  1972,  and  August  1976and 
then  only  with  rigid  constraints.  In  the  first  two 
cases,  the  Corporation  required  that  existing 
shareholders,  not  the  FDIC,  bear  the  existing  loss 
potential  on  the  bank’s  assets.  The  FDIC  also 
prohibited  dividends  from  being  paid,  required 
new  officers  and  directors  to  be  subject  to  FDIC 
approval,  and  further  restricted  each  bank’s  ac- 
tivities.  In  the  most  recent  case,  direct  assistance 
was  granted  to  keep  the  bank  going  for  three 
weeks  until  a  deposit  assumption  could  be  ar- 
ranged. 
The  fourth  alternative  method  for  protecting 
depositors,  the  organization  of  a  deposit  insurance 
national  bank,  was  utilized  twice  during  1975. 
Section  11  of  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Act 
authorizes  the  FDIC  to  transfer  all  the  insured 
and  fully  secured  deposits  in  the  closed  bank  to 
the  new  bank.  Those  funds  are  then  available  to 
their  owners  to  the  same  extent  as  they  were  in 
the  closed  bank.  Deposit  insurance  national 
banks  can  remain  in  existence  a  maximum  of  two 
years,  during  which  time  the  FDIC  can  make  a 
public  offering  of  stock  in  the  new  bank.  Through 
this  procedure,  the  Corporation  hopes  to  encour- 
age  local  communities  to  consider  the  establish- 
ment  and  capitalization  of  a  new  bank  before  a 
final  disposition  oi  assets  and  transfer  oi  deposits 
from  the  insolvent  bank. 
Congressional  interest  in  the  FDIC’s  role  in 
recent  years,  however,  has  shifted  away  from  the 
metl~od that  the  Corporation  uses  to  handle  the  pro- 
tection  of  depositors’  funds  to  the  question  of  the 
Agency’s  role  in  the  prevenfion  of bank  failures.  The 
Corporation  has  not  escaped  criticism  on  its  de- 
positor  insurance  methods  during  this  period: 
though.  The  Hunt  Commission  Report  expressed 
the  view  that  the  dominant  criterion  used  by 
Federal  insurance  agencies  in  meeting  claims 
should  be  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the  community 
involved,  not  the  minimization  of  payouts  from 
the  insurance  fund  [G, p.  731.  The  Commission’s 
report  suggested  the  need  for  a  reevaluation  of 
deposit  insurance  legislation.  This  important 
issue  had  clearly  been  subjugated  in  legislative 
priorities,  however,  to  the  prevention  of  bank 
failures.  Increasing  emphasis  has  been  placed  on 
the  Federal  regulatory  agencies’  responsibilities 
in  preventing  bank  failures.  These  agencies  have 
long  sought  to  promote  sound  banking  through 
examinations  wherein  management  and  financial 
conditions  are  evaluated.  In  the  course  of  these 
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correct  unsafe  or  unsound  practices  or  violations 
of  law  and  regulations  before  such  practices  prove 
fatal  to  the  bank. 
Congressional  and  regulatory  attention  has 
shifted  to  detection  of  bank  problems  at  an  early 
enough  date  to  prevent  failures.  Congress  and 
the  financial  community  have  come  to  expect 
bank  regulators  to  step  in  and  salvage  a  bank  in 
trouble  either  as  a  corporate  entity  or  as  a  party 
to  a  merger.  The  number  of  bank  failures  is  not 
the  Corporation’s  concern,  however.  The  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation’s  primary  function 
has  been  the  protection  of  the  banking  system  from 
the  consequences  of  bank  failures-i-e.,  the  creation 
of  problems  for  otherwise  healthy  banks  and  de- 
stabilizing  influences  on  the  nation’s  money 
suPPlY*  Former  FDIC  Chairman  Frank  Wille 
interprets  the  Corporation’s  mission  to  be  one  of 
minimizing  the  impact  of  a  bank  failure. 
When  an  insured  bank,  despite  efforts  at  cor- 
rection,  progresses  to  the  point  where  actual  failure 
appears  likely,  FDIC  . .  conceives  its  mission  to  be 
not  the  prevention  of  failure  at  whatever  cost  but 
the  protection  of  depositors  and  the  maintenance 
of  public  confidence  in  the  banking  system  as  a 
whole  despite  the  failure.  We  seek,  in  other  words, 
a  ‘soft  landing’  which  minimizes  the  impact  of  a 
bank  failure  in  a  community  .  .  .  [123. 
But  how  does  the  Corporation  presently  feel  this 
responsibility  is  best  carried  out?  For  this 
answer  it  is  best  to  look  to  recent  experience. 
Two  Recent  Failures  Examination  of  recent 
FDIC  policy  and  procedure  in  handling  bank 
failures  is  quite  revealing.  The  largest  failures  in 
U.  S.  history,  as  well  as  the  most  publicized  in 
recent  years,  have  been  those  experienced  by 
U.  S.  National  Bank  of  San  Diego  (USNB)  and 
Franklin  National  Bank,  New  York.  Criminal 
charges  have  been  filed  in  both  instances  alleging 
improper  or  illegal  actions  by  top  management. 
Each  case  reveals  that  conscious  efforts  were 
made  to  misrepresent  the  true  financial  conditions 
of  the  banks  and  to  deceive  regulatory  authorities. 
The  failure  of  U.  S.  National  Bank  of  San 
Diego  on  October  18,  1973,  at  the  time  the  largest 
bank  in  U.  S.  history  to  collapse  ($934  million  in 
deposits),  was  the  subject  of  a  hearing  before  the 
Bank  Supervision  and  Insurance  Subcommittee 
of  the  House  Banking  and  Currency  Committee. 
At  that  time,  Mr.  Wille  pinpointed  the  steps 
taken  by  the  Corporation  incident  to  the  transfer 
of  certain  assets  and  liabilities  to  Cracker  Na- 
tional  Bank,  San  Fran,cisco.  Of  particular  inter- 
est  to  the  Subcommittee  were  the  FDIC’s  in- 
volvement  with  USNB  since  its  identification  .as 
a  problem  bank  and  the  Corporation’s  consider- 
ation  of  the  alternative  methods  available  to  it  to 
protect  the  bank’s  depositors  and  other  creditors. 
In  the  last  few  weeks  before  USNB  was  closed, 
during  which  time  the  FDIC  began  preparations 
in  the  event  the  bank  did  fail,  Corporation  per- 
sonnel  went  to  San  Diego  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  specific  and  detailed  financial  informa- 
tion  to  be  utilized  in  discussions  with  banks  i:n- 
terested  in  acquirin,  v  USNB’s  offices  and  banking 
business.  Concurrently,  reviews  of  the  Com:p- 
troller’s  examination  reports,  provided  to  the 
Corporation,  were  started  in  order  to  measu’re 
the  FDIC’s  insurance  risk.  Estimates  were  th.at 
an  insurance  payoff  in  this  case  would  necessitate 
an  initial  FDIC  outlay  of  approximately  $700 
million  and  would  result  in  the  immediate  loss  Iof 
the  use  of  nearly  $230  million  to  the  approxi- 
mately  3,300  depositors  whose  deposits  exceeded 
the  $20,000  insurance  limit  in  effect  at  that  time. 
In  the  judgment  of  the  FDIC  Board  of  Directors 
and  outside  bankers  involved  in  consultation, 
such  action  would  have  shaken  public  confidence 
in  the  nation’s  entire  banking  system,  with  espe- 
cially  severe  repercussions  in  California.  con- 
sidering  such  a  payoff  to  be  the  last  resort,  the 
Corporation  also  rejected  direct  assistance  to 
USNB  because  the  statutory  requirement  that 
the  continued  operation  of  the  bank  was  essential 
to  provide  adequate  banking  service  in  the  corn- 
munity  could  not  be  substantiated.  It  was  also 
felt  that  USNB’s  controlling  stockholder,  respon- 
sible  for  many  of  the  bank’s  difficulties,  would 
benefit  financially  from  the  assistance. 
The  Corporation  began  to  formulate  a  tran:s- 
action  proposal  that  it  hoped  would  transfer  sub- 
stantially  all  the  banking  business  of  USNB  at  a 
sufficiently  high  price  to  satisfy  the  requirement, 
as  interpreted  by  Congress  and  the  FDIC,  that 
the  merger  would  minimize  the  loss  to  the  Co:r- 
poration’s  insurance  fund.  It  was  recognized  that 
if  this  could  not  be  arranged  the  payoff  method 
would  be  implemented.  Serious  discussions  were 
begun  with  three  major  California  banks  that 
expressed  an  interest  in  acquiring  USNB.  In 
order  to  insure  competitive  bidding,  the  remain- 
ing  four  banks  in  the  state  capable  of  assuming 
nearly  $1  billion  in  liabilities  were  also  contacted. 
Two  of  these  decided  not  to  participate  in  thle 
bidding  for  internal  reasons,  while  the  other  two 
confronted  serious  antitrust  problems.  After  con- 
sultations  with  the  Antitrust  Division  of  the  De- 
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banks  would  be  contacted  only  if  no  acceptable 
bids  were  obtained  from  the  other  three  banks. 
Once  it  became  obvious  that  the  failure  was 
imminent,  the  FDIC  took  steps  necessary  to 
guarantee  an  efficient,  expedient  solution.  Se- 
gotiations  on  a purchase  and  assumption  proposal 
among  the  three  banks  and  the  Corporation  were 
agreed  upon.  In  case  the  bidding  did  not  realize 
a  premium  that  would  conform  to  statutory  re- 
quirements,  a  contingency  plan  for  a  payoff  was 
drawn.  Mr.  Wille’s  statement  before  the  Sub- 
committee  was,  therefore,  carefu1  to  emphasize 
that  the  Corporation,  after  careful  consideration 
of  all  available  alternatives,  chose  to  meet  its 
obligations  through  the  method  that  was  of 
greatest  benefit  to  the  public  within  statutory  con- 
straints. 
Within  three  hours  of  the  closing  of  USNB  by 
the  Comptroller  and  the  FDIC  being  named  as 
receiver,  bids  were  accepted  and  analyzed  as  to 
their  sufficiency,  and  court  approval  to  the  pro- 
posed  acquisition  was  granted.  The  next  morn- 
ing  all  of  USSB’s  offices  reopened  at  their  usual 
business  hours  as  branches  of  Cracker  National 
Bank.  The  threat  of  destabilizing  and  disruptive 
influences  on  the  American  banking  system  was 
thus  averted. 
When  Franklin  Sational  Bank  ($1.7  billion  in 
deposits)  failed  in  October  1971,  it  captured  the 
distinction  of  becoming  the  biggest  bank  failure 
in  U.  S.  history.  Once  the  twentieth  largest  bank 
in  the  country,  Franklin’s  failure  resulted  from  a 
series  of  poor  management  decisions.  Banking 
analysts  generally  agree  that  the  bank’s  lack  of 
earning  power,  combined  with  relatively  high 
loan  losses,  large  losses  in  foreign  exchange 
transactions,  and  heavy  reliance  on  the  use  of 
short-term  borrowings  in  the  money  market  to 
back  relatively  long-term  loans,  made  its  failure 
a  foregone  conclusion.  Of  the  65  banks  in  its 
size  category  ($1  billion  to  $5  billion  in  de- 
posits),  Franklin  ranked  last  in  earnings  power 
with  a  return  on  assets  of  only  .23  percent.  Mas- 
sive  withdrawals  of  deposits  (53  percent  of  total 
deposits)  followed  the  announcement  of  large 
foreign  exchange  losses  in  May  1971.  Only  heavy 
borrowings  from  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
kept  the  bank  afloat  until  Comptroller  James 
Smith  determined  the  bank  to  be  insolvent  and 
appointed  the  FDIC  as  receiver. 
Following  the  USXB  precedent  of  a  year 
earlier,  the  Corporation  immediateI>-  accepted 
bids  from  se\-era1  Kew  York  banks  and  named 
European-American  Bank  and  Trust  Co.  as  the 
winner  in  the  bidding  to  assume  all  oi  the  deposit 
liabilities  and  certain  assets  of  Franklin  with 
FDIC  assistance.  The  next  morning  Franklin’s 
104  branches  in  the  Sew  York  area  opened  for 
business  as  usual  as  branches  of  European-Amer- 
ican.  The  apparent  ease  with  which  the  deposit 
assumption  \=:as completed  was,  in  fact,  the  end 
result  of  five  difficult  months  of  contractual  ne- 
gotiations  wish  potential  buyers.  During  this 
period,  the  FDIC  attempted  to  insure  competitive 
bidding  by  more  than  one  bank  on  a  contractual 
basis  acceptable  to  all  parties.l  The  restric- 
tion  placed  on  the  use  of  the  deposit  assumption 
method  was  :he  decision  not  to  contribute  cash 
assistance  exceeding  the  $750  million  estimated 
necessary  to  pay  off  all  insured  deposits.  If 
terms  of  sale  resulting  in  a  smaller  payout  from 
the  deposit  insurance  fund  could  not  be  arranged, 
the  deposit  payoff  method  would  have  been  fol- 
lowed. 
During  the  time  of  negotiations,  it  became  ap- 
parent  that  rile  assisted  sale  of  Franklin  would 
not  be  possible  without  a  coordinated  effort 
among  the  banking  agencies.  The  Comptroller  of 
the  Current:.  constantly  monitored  Franklin’s 
financial  condition  whiIe  the  Federal  Reserve  ad- 
vanced  the  bank  nearly  $1.75  billion  through  its 
discount  window  in  an  effort  to  seek  an  efficient 
solution  to  the  crisis.”  Interagency  cooperation 
may:  in  fact?  have  ad\-anced  to  the  stage  where 
the  System  was  “buying  time”  for  the  best  solu- 
tion  possible,  as  Mr.  Wille  implied. 
Where  widespread  public  reaction  to  a  precipi- 
tous  bank  fanure  is  possible,  and  time  is  needed  to 
work  out  a  more  orderly  solution,  either  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  or  the  FDIC  may  be  willing  to  ad- 
vance  funds  to  the  bank  on  a  short-term,  secured 
basis  [12]. 
FDIC  concern  for  the  level  of  uninsured  de- 
posits  and  the  interruption  of  banking  services 
within  a  community  has  clearly  made  the  direct 
pavoff  of  insr?red  deposits  an  undesirable  alter-  d 
native  in  the  case  of  large  banks.  Consideration 
of  the  impact  a  bank  failure  has  on  the  financial 
community  (in  Franklin’s  case  both  national  and 
international  in  scope)  has  become  of  major  im- 
: For  a  detailed disckxure  of  the  FDIC’s  participation  in  the solution 
to  the  Franklin  pz~biem,  see  [IS]. 
?Federal  Reserve  s+.-antes  were  subsequently  assumed  by  the  FDIC 
and  will  be  repaid  hr~ely  through  liquidation  of  Franklin  assets 
held  by  <be FDIC. 
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entirely  conceivable  that  a  policy  of  minimizing 
the  shock  waves  of  a  bank  failure  in  the  economy 
may  eventually  come  into  direct  conflict  with  the 
requirement  that  a  deposit  assumption  be  shown 
to  minimize  a  threatened  loss  to  the  Corporation 
insurance  fund.  This  potential  conflict  certainly 
calls  into  question  sole  reliance  on  the  comparison 
between  direct  liabilities  of  the  FDIC  under  the 
deposit  payoff  and  deposit  assumption  techniques 
as  the  basis  for  choosing  between  these  methods. 
This  comparison  has  become  necessary  due  to 
great  concern  in  the  past  with  the  absolute  size 
of  the  insurance  fund  and  its  ability  to  cover 
excessive  bank  failures.  Since  the  impact  on  the 
insurance  fund  has  served  as  a  constraint  on  the 
Corporation’s  attempts  to  give  maximum  sup- 
port  to  the  nation’s  money  stock,  examination  of 
this  restriction  seems  in  order. 
Adequacy  of  the  Insurance  Fund  Kenneth  Scott 
and  Thomas  Mayer,  in  an  article  [7]  based  upon 
research  undertaken  for  the  Hunt  Commission, 
argue  that  insurance  assessment  rates  have  forced 
banks  to  bear  substantially  more  of  the  costs  of 
bank  failures  than  they  have  generated.  Ac- 
knowledging  that  banks  should  be  expected  to 
cover  losses  attributable  to  fraud,  misconduct, 
and  “normal”  managerial  failure,  they  present 
evidence  supporting  their  contention  that  assess- 
ment  rates  have  been  sufficiently  high  to  gener- 
ate  a  large  surplus  over  what  is  needed  to  cover 
these  losses. 
The  only  justification  for  such  rates  is  the  con- 
tingency  for  failures  due  to  gross  perturbations  in 
the  economy  attributable  to  the  conduct  of  national 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy.  Deposit  insurance  for 
this  fourth  category  of  failures  seems  fully  war- 
ranted  on  macroeconomic  grounds  as  a  safeguard 
against  sharp  and  unplanned  contractions  in  the 
money  supply.  The  cost  of  this  category  of  cover- 
age,  however,  should  be  borne  directly  by  the  fed- 
eral  government  as  the  party  responsible-and  not 
placed  on  banks  .  .  . 
9001. 
and  their  customers  [7,  p. 
3If.  in  fact.  we  have  100  nercent  den&t  insurance  for  large  banks. 
the-question  arises  whether  the  same  protection  should  be-afg$ei 
small  banks  on  equitable  as  well  as  competitive  grounds. 
discussion of  the  need  for  review  of  present  deposit  insurance  legis- 
lation,  particularly  concerning  large  bank  failures,  see  [4]  and  [5]. 
The  latter  argues  that  100  percent  deposit insurance  would eliminate 
the  conflict  in  social  goals  that  arises  when  considering  whether  a 
large  bank  should  be  allowed  to  fail.  Optimal  resource  allocation 
suggests  that  inefficient  firms,  regardless  of  size,  must  be  allowed 
to  fail.  The  stabilization  goal.  on  the  other  hand,  suggests  that 
large  bank  failures  should  be  prevented  lest  they  lead  to  runs  on 
other  banks  and  to  a  reduction  in  the  money  supply.  Complete 
protection  for  depositors  (but  not  stockholders)  would  retain  the 
disciplinary  impact  potential  failure  has  on  bank  management  but. 
at  the  same  time,  would  serve  to  insulate the  money  stock  from  the 
hazards  of  large  bank  failures.  Since the  FDIC  usually  protects  all 
deposits.  eliminating  the  insurance  ceiling  de  ju,  as  well  as  & 
facto  would  remove  the  uncertainty  that  large  depositors  now  face. 
Such  a  policy  would  also  eliminate  the  potential  conflict  between 
the  objectives  of  minimizing  the  destabilizing  impact  of  a  bank 
failure  and  minimizing  the  cost  to  the  deposit  insurance  fund. 
If  this  view  is  accepted,  there  would  be  little 
need  for  regulators  or  legislators  to  look  upon  a 
potential  exhaustion  of  the  insurance  fund  as  a 
disaster.  If  the  concept  of  the  “adequacy”  of  the 
fund  were  altered  to  exclude  the  contingency  for 
failures  resulting  from  the  conduct  of  stabiliz.a- 
tion  policy,  assessment  rates  could  be  lowered  to 
correspond  with  the  experience  of  failures  result- 
ing  from  bank  practices.  A  major  practical  prob- 
lem  of  implementing  such  a  program,  howeve:r, 
would  be  in  distinguishing  bank  failures  attri’b- 
utable  to  stabilization  policy  from  other  causes. 
Past  losses  and  disbursements  have  largely  been 
attributable  to  the  first  three  causes  of  failures. 
From  this  experience  the  accumulation  of  funds 
for  insurance  purposes  may  have  been  excessive. 
The  argument  for  increased  Government  sup- 
port  of  the  insurance  fund  is  not  needed,  howeve:r, 
to  draw  attention  to  the  facts  that  the  present 
fund  is  substantial,  has  never  been  threatened  by 
depletion,  and  presently  has  a  potentially  urn- 
limited  source  of  additional  funds.  The  U.  S. 
Treasury  stands  behind  the  FDIC  in  case  the 
insurance  fund  is  threatened.  With  a  present 
reserve  of  approximately  $6.7  billion,  the  Cor- 
poration  also  has  what  amounts  to  a  blank  check 
on  the  Treasury.  It  can  draw  another  $3  billion 
immediately  and  after  a  short  delay  can  obtain 
any  additional  amount  if  needed.  Although  527 
insured  banks  have  failed  since  the  Agency  was 
established,  additional  Treasury  funds  have  nev’er 
been  used.  Through  42  years  of  operation,  the 
FDIC  has  incurred  losses  of  $247  million,  includ- 
ing  estimated  losses  on  active  cases-approxi- 
mately  3.7  percent  of  the  present  fund.4  This 
loss  experience  suggests  the  Corporation  has  prco- 
tected  the  insurance  fund  in  an  extremely  capable 
manner.  Minimization  of  the  loss  to  the  insur- 
ance  fund  may  interfere,  however,  with  the  pri- 
mary  function  of  deposit  insurance-the  stabili- 
zation  of  the  money  supply-a  responsibility  it 
shares  with  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
FDIC  and  the  Fed:  A  Common  Bond  The  Fed- 
eral  Reserve,  through  the  conduct  of  monetary 
policy,  attempts  to  maintain  the  domestic  money 
supply  at  levels  consistent  with  the  financial 
health  of  the  nation’s  economy.  Through  its  dis- 
‘The  trend  toward  large  bank  failures  may  have  further  implica- 
tions  for  the  adequacy  of  the  insurance  fund.  however.  If  one  of 
the  largest  banks  in  the  country  were  to  fail,  initial  FDIC  cash 
outlays  would  likely  exceed  the  present  level  of  the  fund.  This 
would  be  the  case  even  if  liquidation  of  the  bank’s  assets  held  by 
the  Corporation  resulted  in  a  zero  loss  to  the  fund.  Under  such 
circumstances.  Treasury  assistance  would  presumably  be  required 
in  the  interim. 
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number  of  commercial  banks,  the  Fed  has  ac- 
knowledged  responsibility  to  provide  funds  on  a 
secured  basis  to  solvent  but  temporarily  illiquid 
banks.  The  purpose  of  this  “lender  of  last  resort” 
function  is  to  insure  the  viability  of  banks  expe- 
riencing  short-term  liquidity  problems-thereby 
protecting  the  public’s  confidence  in  banking, 
thus  preventing  runs  on  bank  deposits  and  de- 
stabilizing  impacts  on  the  money  supply.  Deposit 
insurance  has  a  similar  rationale.  By  minimizing 
the  risk  of  deposit  loss  from  bank  failure,  deposit 
insurance  limits  the  potential  cost  of  holding 
money  in  the  form  of  deposits.  This  discourages 
the  withdrawal  of  deposits  that,  if  widespread, 
can  cause  a  sharp  reduction  in  the  money  supply. 
The  distinction  between  a  temporarily  illiquid 
bank  and  an  insolvent  one  provides  the  Federal 
Reserve  a  benchmark  with  regard  to  which  the 
decision  to  employ  its  lending  function  may  be 
made.  Our  system  of  bank  supervision  and  re- 
view  usually  provides  the  regulatory  authorities 
with  the  information  necessary  to  pass  on  the 
financial  conditions  of  individual  banks.  Once 
it  is  determined  that  a  bank  cannot  remain  viable, 
the  problem  of  how  its  operations  and  liabilities 
should  best  be  handled  arises.  The  FDIC  dis- 
poses  of  those  necessary  failures  in  a manner  that, 
while  in  the  public’s  best  interest,  gives  masi- 
mum  support  to  the  circulating  medium. 
Regulatory  Review  There  is  a  recognized  need 
for  bank  examiners  and  analysts  to  keep  up  with 
trends  and  innovations  within  the  banking  indus- 
try.  The  banking  agencies’  capabilities  in  meet- 
ing  their  examining  responsibilities  are  dependent 
on  obtaining  enough  information  to  reveal  the 
true  condition  of  each  bank.  This  places  great 
importance  on  the  supervisors’  investigative 
skills.  Regulators  have  expressed  a  need  for 
greater  attention  to  the  safeguards  to  bank  sound- 
ness  and  stability.  This  concern  joins  the  con- 
tinuing  goals  of  promotion  of  competition  in 
banking  and  adaptation  of  the  banking  system  to 
meet  changing  needs  for  credit  as  the  focus  of 
regulation. 
The  Federal  banking  agencies,  charged  with 
supervising  the  country’s  commercial  banks,  have 
acknowledged  that  current  esamination  proce- 
dures  may  be  inadequate  to  the  task  of  dealing 
with  the  sophisticated  policies  of  today’s  banks. 
A  move  toward  continuous  monitoring  rather 
than  single  examinations  is,  therefore,  underway. 
In  addition,  an  estensive  review  of  the  entire 
regulatory  process  in  banking  has  been  initiated 
by  Congress  and  will,  undoubtedly,  receive  fur- 
ther  attention  in  future  years. 
Public  confidence-the  very  foundation  of  the 
banking  system’s  existence-is  based,  fortunately, 
on  more  than  just  the  banking  agencies’  capacity 
to  “bail  out”  banks  in  trouble.  For  in  some  cases, 
whether  because  of  fraudulent  actions  by  bank 
officials  or  the  inability  of  regulators  to  correct 
management  deficiencies,  banks  ynust  be  allowed  to 
fail.  Public  confidence  in  the  banking  industry  is 
based  on  the  belief  that  banking  authorities  can 
assure  stability  through  a  coordinated  program  of 
regulation  and  supervision  designed  to  limit  bank 
failures  only  to  unavoidable  cases  and  to  efficient 
disposition  of  fhose  banks  that  do  faiZ. 
Summary  Recent  experience  has  revealed  ex- 
tensive  coordination  and  cooperation  among  Fed- 
eral  banking  authorities  in  the  handling  of  failing 
banks.  This  is  both  encouraging  and  crucial  to 
the  effort  to  support  the  banking  system.  This 
interagency  cooperation  has  made  it  possible  for 
banking  authorities  to  lend  maximum  support  to 
the  nation’s  money  supply  in  those  cases  where  a 
bank  failure  cannot  be  avoided.  Adhering  to  a 
policy  of  minimizing  the  shock  waves  to  the  rest 
of  the  financial  community,  the  FDIC  has  re- 
cently  shown  a  decided  preference  for  the  deposit 
assumption  method  where  statutory  requirements 
can  be  met.  But  what  will  happen  if  the  method 
that  is  in  the  public’s  best  interest  comes  into 
conflict  with  the  constraint  that  the  assumption 
route  may  only  be  used  if  it  minimizes  the  loss 
to  the  Corporation’s  insurance  fund?  What 
would  have  been  the  impact  on  the  economy  had 
US;?;B  or  Franklin  Xational  been  placed  in  re- 
ceivership  and  only  the  insured  deposits  paid  off? 
It  is  doubtful  that  the  degree  of  confidence  in 
the  banking  system  would  have  remained  as  high 
as  it  did  had  thousands  of  depositors  lost  millions 
of  dollars  in  uninsured  deposits.  Yet  it  is  clear 
what  action  the  FDIC  is  required  to  take  if  such 
a  conflict  occurs.  The  concern  for  the  effect 
individual  failures  have  on  the  insurance  fund 
could,  under  current  legal  requirements,  eventu- 
ally  force  the  Corporation  to  resort  to  a  large  de- 
posit  payoff  that  may  damage  the  public’s  trust 
in  banking  and  the  regulatory  authorities’  ability 
to  support  the  nation’s  money  supply.  If  the 
latter  continues  as  the  objective  of  deposit  insur- 
ance,  a  reevaluation  of  insurance  legislation  ap- 
pears  necessary  to  resolve  the  problems  raised 
by  large  bank  failures. 
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